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Sammendrag 
Det finnes ingen tidligere empiriske undersøkelser av om skatteundragelse påvirkes av offentlige 
skattelister. Våre resultater tyder på at elektronisk søkbare skattelister på internett øker rapportert 
inntekt. Den antatte hovedmekanismen er at det ikke er allment akseptert å unndra skatt. Vissheten om 
at naboer og bekjente observerer innkekt gjør det mer kostbart å jukse. Dersom det er et stort sprik 
mellom observert levestandard og inntekt, kan en risikere en å bli mistenkt for å unndra inntekt fra 
beskatning.  
 
I likhet med mange andre analyser av skatteunndragelser, antar vi at det primært er selvstendig 
næringsdrivende og andre småbedriftseiere som kan bestemme hvor mye inntekt som rapporteres inn. 
For lønnstakere er inntekter og fradrag i stor grad rapportert inn av tredjepart, og vi forventer derfor 
ikke at denne gruppen er like påvirket av om det er åpenhet eller ikke.  
 
Vi bruker overgangen til internettpublisering høsten 2001 som et tidsskille. Før dette kunne folk 
oppsøke det lokale skattekontoret og finne ønsket informasjon på papir. Men det er en hovedantakelse 
at overgangen til internettpublisering øker eksponeringen og den potensielle ”tapt anseelse”-effekten. 
For å få sikrere identifikasjon utnytter vi at det i noen norske kommuner var nær fullskala distribusjon 
av informasjon også før 2001. Vi har funnet frem til 31 norske kommuner hvor det lokale idrettslaget 
eller korpset solgte kataloger med skatteinformasjon om alle innbyggerne i kommunen på dør til dør-
basis. Personene i disse kommunene fikk en vesentlig mindre endring i eksponering ved overgangen 
til internettpublisering i 2001 og er dermed kontrollgruppen i vår analyse. Småbedriftseiere i disse 
kommunene sammenliknes med eksperimentgruppen; småbedriftseiere i kommuner uten salg av 
kataloger med informasjon om alle innbyggerne. 
 
Etter å ha kontrollert for en rekke egenskaper ved både personer og kommuner som kan tenkes å 
påvirke inntektsvekst, finner vi at småbedriftseierne i eksperimentgruppen har en gjennomsnittlig 
inntektsvekst i de fire årene etter internettpubliseringen som er 3 prosent høyere enn det vi ser i 
kontrollgruppen. Omregnet i kroner finner vi at rapportert inntekt øker med om lag 10 000 kroner i 
året i gjennomsnitt ved at skattelistene legges ut på nettet og anslår en provenyøkning på om lag en 
halv milliard kroner. Vi sensitivitetstester resultatene, og ser på heterogene effekter, som støtter opp 
under antakelsen at det er frykt for tapt anseelse som ligger bak inntektsøkningene. 
 
Internasjonalt sett er dette den første analysen som måler effekter av åpenhet om inntekts- og 
skatteinformasjon på personers rapportering av inntekter til skattemyndighetene. At norske data er de 
første som brukes til dette er ikke rart siden Norge er temmelig alene om å ha et slikt system. For 
mange land vil det være utenkelig å tillate en slik åpenhet, siden informasjon om skatt, inntekt og 
formue anses som privat.
1 Introduction
Although not often explicitly stated, an important reason for a system of public
disclosure of tax and income information is that it arguably deters people from tax
evasion. For instance, given that neighbors and acquaintances observe income and
expenditure details, taxpayers may be reluctant to underreport income, because a
lack of correspondence between consumption of durables, such as a house and car,
and reported income, may induce reactions (from the neighbors and acquaintances)
or represent a reputational loss. However, to our knowledge, the e¤ects of public
disclosure on individual income reporting have never been systematically explored.
One reason is that very few countries practice public disclosure of tax information
at the individual level. As far as we know, only Finland, Sweden, Iceland and
Norway have some sort of public disclosure at the personal level,1 but Norway is
exceptional in that (according to the present system) individual income tax return
information can be accessed through electronic search.
Norway has a long history of public disclosure of information from income tax
returns, going back at least to the middle of the nineteenth century (NOU, 2009:1).
Citizens could visit the local tax o¢ ce or the city hall and look through a book that
contained information about each taxpayer in the local area. Persons were listed by
name and address, along with key measures from the income tax return: income,
tax payment, and wealth. The information was generally available for three weeks
after the tax statement was made public. As the media had access to the same
type of information, local newspapers would often communicate highlights from the
lists, such as rankings of the citizens with highest wealth and income, or incomes
of sports and entertainment celebrities.
However, the advent of the Internet changed the form of the public disclosure
of tax information rather dramatically. In the fall of 2001, a national newspaper
o¤ered online access to tax information for the whole population through the web
version of the newspaper, and soon all of the major national newspapers followed.
Now, one could simply sit at home by the computer and obtain information about
relatives, friends, neighbors, or celebrities. Whereas not many people took the
trouble to visit the local tax o¢ ce for manual searches, obtaining the same infor-
mation by computerized searches from home substantially reduced the information
access hurdle. The web pages o¤ering search engines for tax information have been
among the most popular websites in Norway, especially shortly after the release of
new annual information.
The practice of public disclosure was controversial even in the days of paper
lists, but Internet access generated substantial resistance. Openness was chal-
1We are aware some examples of public tax disclosure from other countries in earlier times,
such as France, Italy and the United States.
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lenged by arguments referring to invasion of privacy, spurred by idle curiosity or
more nefarious motivation. Examples of the latter included alleged tax-list-based
bullying among school children and tax lists found on criminals in the act of bur-
glary. These examples may have inuenced the decision to revise the system.
Beginning in 2011, with respect to the tax statement for 2010, one can still click
into the tax lists, but now one only gets access through a personalised log-in system
for accessing online public services, which involves a pin-code and a password.2
The objective of the present analysis is, by the use of micro-unit income tax
return data, to assess to what extent people react to public disclosure by reporting
a di¤erent level of income than they otherwise would do. We treat the move from
books in local o¢ ces to the Internet as a fundamental shift in public disclosure
intensity, which can be exploited in an identication strategy based on evaluations
of before and after outcomes. Given that wage earners have rather limited scope
for tax evasion (third-party reporting is a standard procedure), compared to the
self-employed and other owners of businesses, one may use observations of incomes
of wage earners and owners of businesses before and after 2001 to obtain estimates
of the public disclosure e¤ect.
Because there are several other reasons for wage income and business income
to move separately over time, we further rene the identication strategy by ex-
ploiting the fact that in a number of municipalities, prior to 2001 tax information
about local residents was widely distributed through sales of paper copies of the
tax lists. We consider the information level of these paper catalogues to be closer
to Internet access, which implies that we can categorize our income data observa-
tions according to belonging to a municipality with substantial pre-2001 tax-return
information di¤usion, or not.
With respect to econometric identication, one would reasonably argue that
business owners are e¤ectively randomly assigned to the two di¤erent categories
of municipalities: municipalities with no pre-2001 special information distribution
arrangements, and municipalities with availability of paper catalogues prior to
2001. A survey, tracking areas with and without pre-2001 special arrangements,
identied 31 municipalities where there were sales of books of tax return tran-
scripts, and 107 municipalities with no such arrangements. It follows that the
business owners in the latter group experienced a completely di¤erent information
di¤usion system after 2001, when the nationwide full-scale electronic version be-
gan, which may have had reporting e¤ects, whereas no such e¤ects are assumed
in the former group. Applying the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator to compute
di¤erences in mean income changes between the two groups after 2001 holds the
2Despite the fact that the digital search is now more complicated, the tax authorities reported
that as many as 709,000 unique users (from a total population of approximately 5 million people)
carried out 13 million searches in 2011 (Norwegian Tax Administration, 2012).
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promise of identifying the e¤ect of Internet public disclosure on the income report-
ing of business owners.
The sample of individuals used in this study consists of persons from 138 mu-
nicipalities (out of a total of near 430 municipalities in Norway), observed before
and after 2001 (from 1997 to 2004), and categorized according to two di¤erent
systems of information availability prior to 2001. As the income data we have
available for this study are register-based and cover the whole population, this
data set consists of approximately 370,000 individuals of working age, observed
over eight years. Several individual and municipality characteristics are accounted
for in the empirical analyses.
Although the analysis utilizes a large number of control variables, there may
still be unobserved di¤erences between individuals in municipalities where there
were no availability of paper catalogues prior to 2001 (treatment group) and in-
dividuals in municipalities which had distribution of paper catalogues before 2001
(control group). Omitted variable problems and other measurement issues are
explored through several robustness tests, discussed after presenting the main es-
timates. Here we also discuss the heterogeneity of responses.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we briey discuss the back-
ground for public disclosure. The empirical strategy is described in Section 3, and
Section 4 presents the results, including a number of sensitivity tests. Section 5
concludes the paper.
2 Deterrence e¤ects of public disclosure
2.1 The deterrence mechanism
Public disclosure is designed to reduce the attractiveness of tax noncompliance
as well as aggressive, but arguably legal, tax avoidance. Disclosure may comple-
ment deterrence by encouraging others with relevant information about true tax
liability to come forward,3 and the fear of that and subsequent tax noncompliance
penalties explicit and shaming dampens such behavior. The rst models of tax
evasion, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974), focused on the trade-
o¤ between pecuniary quantities (lower tax burden versus the risk of penalty).4
These models have been extended in several directions, including frameworks that
have accounted for moral sentiments of guilt and shame (Erard and Feinstein, 1994)
and social conformity e¤ects (Myles and Naylor, 1996; Fortin, Lacroix and Ville-
3In Norway, the National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and En-
vironmental Crime (ØKOKRIM) has a designated phone number for whistle-blowing.
4However, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) mention that tax evasion may be limited if individ-
uals fear loss of reputation, without including such considerations in their model.
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val, 2007). Laboratory experiments, as reviewed in Alm (2012), provide support
for public disclosure of noncompliance acting as an additional penalty mechanism.
For instance, Corricelli, Jo¢ ly, Montmarquette and Villeval (2010) nd a strong
physiological impact of public display of evaderspictures on the emotional arousal
of tax evasion among evaders. Moreover, Laury andWallace (2005) use experimen-
tal methods to analyze the relationship between the perception of condentiality
and taxpayer compliance, and nd some evidence suggesting that when individ-
uals perceive a breach in condentiality (disclosure), they increase their level of
compliance.
Disclosure may also a¤ect tax reporting through other avenues. Taxpayers may
reduce reported taxable income in order to minimize the attention of the press and
of unsavory characters wishing to take advantage of their economic situation. On
the other hand, some people might get satisfaction bragging rights, if you will
from public appreciation of their level of a­ uence, and may be willing to pay for
it in the form of a higher tax liability.
Defenders of tax privacy argue that taxpayers might feel vulnerable to embar-
rassment or harassment if others have access to their information (Blank, 2011).
However, whereas in Norway there have been alleged examples of bullying of school
children and burglaries based on information from income tax returns, possible pos-
itive e¤ects in terms of the e¤ects on income reporting have been more di¢ cult to
obtain. Both the literature on tax evasion and the literature on social interactions
and tax evasions attest to the identication problems in such studies, stemming
from severe empirical challenges when measuring illegal activities (evasion) and
social interactions (such as reputational harm); see, for instance, Manski (1993)
and Slemrod and Weber (2012).5
Accordingly, the empirical evidence is sparse on public disclosure in the income
tax context. Hasegawa, Hoopes, Ishida and Slemrod (2013) study the e¤ect of the
Japanese income tax disclosure system that was abolished in 2004/2005 on tax
reports of individuals and businesses. They take advantage of the abolition and the
fact that disclosure applied only to taxable incomes above 40,000,000 yen (about
$400,000). They nd strong evidence based on bunching of observations right
below the disclosure threshold that, on average, individuals and businesses prefer
to avoid disclosure; for the latter, this is consistent with the local characterization
of 39 companies, whose reported taxable income is kept below the disclosure
threshold so as not to provide evidence about their protability, which might a¤ect
the deals they can make with other companies. However, Hasegawa et al. uncover
no evidence that disclosure increased reported business taxable income generally.6
5See also Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998) and Slemrod (2007) for surveys of the tax
compliance and the tax evasion literature, respectively, and Brock and Durlauf (2001) on social
interaction models.
6See also Pomeranz (2013) on the e¤ectiveness of the value added tax in facilitating tax
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2.2 Worldwide experience
Historically, there have been shorter spells of public disclosure in some other coun-
tries, such as the U.S. and France.7 Public access to corporate tax information is
permitted in Japan, Finland, Sweden in addition to Norway (Lenter, Slemrod and
Shackelford, 2003), whereas personal level public disclosure is associated with the
Nordic countries. However, the other Nordic countries have far less openness, as
there is no mass distribution in any of them. Denmark8 has no public disclosure,
whereas Sweden, Finland and Iceland have systems where one can apply to the
tax authorities for information about individuals, in Iceland for only a very limited
time period (Ministry of Finance, 2011). Nevertheless, the issue continues to be
on the policy agenda in several countries. For example, in Italy in 2008 the tax
authorities put all 38.5 million tax returns for 2005 up on the Internet, before
being blacked out following widespread protest.9
2.3 Disclosure of tax evaders
In certain countries, there is public disclosure of information about tax evaders.
For example, under Greek law, the presentation of a new budget is accompanied by
the names of tax evaders in the previous year compiled by the nance ministry. In
New Zealand the Commissioner of Inland Revenue regularly releases a document
entitled "Tax Evaders Gazette" that lists those taxpayers who have been prose-
cuted or had penal tax imposed for evading their taxation obligations; as of April
1997 the Commissioner is able to also publish the names of those taxpayers in-
volved with "abusive tax avoidance." The Canadian Customs and Revenue agency
compliance strategy includes publicizing court convictions for tax fraud. In Ire-
land, a list of tax defaulters was formerly published on annual basis in the Revenue
Commissioners Annual Report, but recently the list is published on a quarterly
basis in Iris Oigiuil (the o¢ cial newspaper of record in Ireland in which several
legal notices, including insolvency notices, are required by law to be published)
and reported in the national and local newspapers. According to the tax agency,
this measure "aims to raise the prole of compliance and provide a continuous de-
terrent to other potential tax evaders. Frequently, taxpayers make a full disclosure
of irregularities to auditors at the commencement of an audit to avoid the possi-
bility of being published for tax o¤ences." Moreover, the well-publicized quarterly
enforcement, providing micro-empirical evidence for the self-enforcing power of the paper trail
in the VAT.
7See IRS (2011) for an overview over the history of public disclosure in the U.S.
8However, Denmark has recently (June, 2012) begun public disclosure of tax payments in the
corporate sector, in order to encourage correct income reporting.
9The Economist, May 8th, 2008. Before being blacked out, vast amount of data were down-
loaded and transferred to other sites or burned in to disks and sold.
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list is "more likely to be spotted by suppliers, customers, business associates and
friends."
3 Empirical strategy
Since the middle of the nineteenth century there has been public disclosure of tax
information in Norway (NOU, 2009:1). In recent decades an interested citizen
could visit the local tax o¢ ce to get access to a book containing a list of each
taxpayer in the local area (name, year of birth, postcode) and three variables from
the income tax return: income, wealth, and taxes paid. Since the tax reform of
1992 the income measure reported is "ordinary income": gross income after the
standard deduction and deductions for debt interest payments.10 The fall of 2001
represents a demarcation line in our empirical strategy because, for the rst time,
the national newspapers transferred the tax return information they received from
the tax authorities (for the year 2000) to web pages. This implies that anyone
with access to a computer and the Internet had access to the same measures, on
a national rather than local scale, that were available prior to 2001 by physically
making a trip to the local tax o¢ ce.
Given that the post-2001 version of public disclosure both involves wider in-
formation range (not restricted to local areas) and a change of mode of public
disclosure (electronic search possibilities), we expect that some people may react
by reporting higher income to the tax authorities in spring 2002 (for the year
2001). Treating the year 2001 as a cut-o¤ point in the empirical analysis rests
upon two assertions. Firstly, under the public disclosure system prior to 2001,
very few people actually visited the local tax o¢ ces for manual searches. We do
not have any hard statistical evidence to justify this claim, but one can easily un-
derstand that for most citizens the costs of physically taking a trip to the location
of the tax information represented a substantial barrier. Only persons with very
low opportunity costs, and/or persons who have a strong desire for acquiring such
information, would have consulted the printed lists. Second, the choice of using
2001 as a critical point in time is founded on electronically available information
being widely spread. Even though Internet coverage has increased substantially
since 2001, Vaage (2001) reports that in 2001 as much as 50 percent of the Norwe-
gian population used the Internet in an average week, and 45 percent used it for
private purposes. Hence, we believe that limited information spread before 2001
and the high level of accessibility after 2001 are su¢ cient conditions for considering
the move to the Internet a dramatic change in exposure.
10The wealth measure is net wealth, and taxes paid is the total of all personal tax paid. There
are no self-reported tax items that are not reected in the disclosed measures.
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Given that the sudden change to Internet disclosure can be seen as a quasi-
experiment, we employ the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator in the following, and
dene Internet disclosure as a binary treatment variable, switching on for a particu-
lar group after the change.11 A standard assumption of the di¤erence-in-di¤erences
method is the assumption that time e¤ects or trends are the same in the absence
of the event (Internet exposure). In other words, without any intervention, the
growth in reported income would have been equal in the groups, conditional on
other characteristics. As the common trend assumption is not testable, the choice
of empirical specication is guided by plausibility, and it follows that it is preferable
to nd a mechanism for group assignment that mimics randomization.
A rst approach to group assignment is a categorization based on contrasting
outcomes for taxpayers who have the possibility to adjust their income with others
who do not have this option. This is reminiscent of Pissarides and Weber (1989),
who initiated an empirical strategy for tax compliance analysis based on dividing
the sample into self-employed and wage earners, under the assumption that the
employees have little or no scope for tax evasion, compared to people running their
own businesses.12 Third-party reporting of employeesincome, which is a standard
procedure in Norway, curbs the possibilities for underreporting among wage earn-
ers (Slemrod, 2007; Kleven et al., 2011), so the same type of categorization may
be applied in the present analysis. An empirical strategy based on identication
of public disclosure e¤ects from comparison of wage earners and business owners
before and after Internet exposure is, however, subject to several possible confound-
ing factors, or time-dependent unobservables. For instance, the business cycle may
have a di¤erent e¤ect on income growth of employees and business owners, so that
the common time trend assumption may be violated. Moreover, a change in the
denition of business income in 2003, see Figure A.2 in Appendix A, conceal the
measurement of incomes after the change. Accordingly, we see no signs of public
disclosure e¤ects (see Appendix B) when estimating a regression model based on
this reasoning.
To facilitate sharper identication, we utilize that the sample can be further
11Following di¤erent groups over time, before and after a major change for one of them,
corresponds to a classical empirical design; see applications in, for instance, Card (1990), Card
and Krueger (1994), and Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003). Athey and Imbens (2006), Blundell
and Dias (2009), Angrist and Pischke (2009), Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) and Lechner (2011)
provide overviews and more details about this identication method.
12Pissarides and Weber (1989) obtain identication of evasion by comparing the ratio of re-
ported income to food consumption in the two groups, based on the assumption that preferences
for food are similarly distributed. While Pissarides and Weber examined survey data, Feldman
and Slemrod (2007) analyze tax noncompliance by using unaudited income tax return data (and
charitable contributions instead of spending on food). See also Hurst, Li and Pugsley (2013),
who argue that there is substantial underreporting of income among self-employed even in survey
data.
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divided into treated and control groups by exploiting a rather peculiar arrangement
prior to Internet access in 2001. Before 2001, the tax authorities, as a service to
local communities, sent the income tax information to local newspapers, which
often published highlights from the lists, such as rankings of the richest, or incomes
of celebrities. But others could apply for a list too, and some local organizations
exploited the attraction of this type of information to nance their activities. In
some, but not all areas, members of the football club or the community band
would go from door-to-door and o¤er copies of the entire tax transcript of that
area for sale. The main assumption behind the exploitation of this institutional
characteristic for identication is that taxpayers in the treated localities, persons in
areas without widespread income tax return information prior to 2001, responded
to a greater degree to the changes in disclosure brought about by the information
becoming available on the Internet compared to those who had this arrangement.
To ascertain which municipalities were treated and which were not, we con-
ducted a survey, tracking local areas with and without the pre-2001 special arrange-
ments. We found 31 municipalities where there were pre-2001 sales of books of tax
return transcripts, and 107 municipalities in which no such arrangements existed;
Figure A1 in the Appendix shows the locations of the two di¤erent categories of
municipalities.13 We argue that in the latter group of municipalities, inhabitants
experienced a fundamental change in the intensity of the information di¤usion
system after 2001, when nationwide full-scale electronic di¤usion emerged.14
Thus, we employ a triple di¤erence set-up in our main specication,15 where log
reported income for individual i at time t, log yijkt, is explained by dummy variables
and combinations of dummy variables, individual characteristics, X
0
it, municipality
characteristics (including municipality xed e¤ects), Z
0
k (k indexes municipalities),
and unobservable individual e¤ects ("ijkt). The dummy variable busj (j indexes
occupations) takes the value 1 if the individual is a business owner (with scope for
underreporting), and 0 if the person is a wage earner, the dummy variable denoted
nocatk takes the value 1 when the individual resides in a municipality with no
availability of paper catalogues prior to 2001 and the time dummy variable, intt,
takes the value 1 if the year is a year with Internet exposure. When we also include
13As the data collection was based on personal contact between interviewers and chief o¢ cers
in the municipalities and therefore was quite resource-intensive. Due to resource constraints, we
stopped the data collection once we had found more than 30 municipalities with pre-2001 sales
of books. At that stage we had identied 107 municipalities with no such arrangements.
14We do not have information about the spread of paper catalogues in the control group prior to
2001, but assume that the institution itself had e¤ect. The price of the catalogues is not expected
to represent an impediment, as prices were relatively low. For example, in the municipality of
Eidskog in 1999 and 2000, the catalogues were sold for 50 Norwegian kroner (or approximately
$6 each) and sales helped the nancing of leisure activities for children.
15See Gruber (1994) for a similar approach, where the procedure is referred to as "di¤erences-
in-di¤erences-in-di¤erences".
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year xed e¤ects, symbolized by t, we have
log yijkt = 0 + t +X
0
it + 1busj + 2 (busj  intt) + 3 (busj  nocatk)
+4 (intt  nocatk) + 5 (busj  intt  nocatk) + Z 0k + "ijkt, (1)
where 0, , , 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are parameters. Municipality xed e¤ects, Z
0
k,
are particularly relevant because the key regressor is dened by a municipality-level
attribute. These control variables hold the promise of picking up contemporaneous
shocks that may a¤ect outcomes. Given that we believe that people are essentially
randomly assigned into groups, we do not expect individual characteristics to be
a source of omitted-variables bias in the measurement of the e¤ect of public dis-
closure, but including X
0
it is helpful for the precision of the regression estimates.
The main parameter of interest is 5. Under the hypothesis that public dis-
closure deters taxpayers from underreporting, reported income increases among
business owners whose informational exposure is more a¤ected by the Internet ac-
cess, and 5 is therefore expected to be positive. If Internet disclosure is a stronger
type of display than paper lists and the income growth of business owners in the
control group are a¤ected by the new disclosure regime too,16 the estimate of
5 is biased downward, and in this sense represents a lower bound of the public
disclosure e¤ects on business ownersincome reporting.
The model specied in Equation (1) can be characterized as exible in the
main regressors (without the control covariates), as it contains a parameter for
every combination of the main explanatory variables observed in the data, which
implies that the additive linear form of Equation (1) is not restrictive (see Angrist
and Pischke, 2009); we will return to the functional form dependency below.
Note that the wage earners enter into Equation (1) as an additional control for
the time trend. If for instance there are omitted variables, such as local idiosyn-
cratic economic shocks, that are not picked up the explanatory variables, it may
be advantageous to use relative income developments for wage earners, in the cat-
alogue and non-catalogue municipalities, as a control. Of course, this rests on the
assumption that wage earnersreactions to local macroeconomic developments are
representative of the responses of business owners. However, if wage earners who
were surprised by the Internet exposure in 2001 (i.e., who lived in a non-catalogue
area) also are able to adjust their income to the new regime, the estimate of 5
is biased downward as a measure of the e¤ect on business owners.17 By letting
the di¤erence in income before and after the Internet exposure be denoted by ,
16For instance, this might occur because Internet disclosure has national scope, whereas the
paper catalogue information was limited to the municipality.
17We cannot rule out that the fourth group, wage earners living in a catalogue area, responded
to the change in exposure as well.
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Equation (1) can be seen as using the income growth for three groups to dene
the counterfactual outcome; the di¤erence between wage earners in the catalogue
and non-catalogue groups, in addition to business owners in a catalogue area:
E ( log yikjnocatk = 1; busj = 1)  E ( log yikjnocatk = 0; busj = 1) 
E ( log yikjnocatk = 1; busj = 0)  E ( log yikjnocatk = 0; busj = 0) = 5. (2)
In Appendix B we also show estimation results when the sample is restricted to
business owners alone, which means that the dimension representing occupation
is removed from Equation (1).
4 Results and sensitivity tests
4.1 Data and descriptive statistics
The primary sources of data for this study are the Income Statistics on Persons
and Families (Statistics Norway, 2006). These statistics hold detailed micro panel
information on the whole Norwegian population derived from several public regis-
ters, including a full coverage of data from income tax returns. We utilize data for
eight years, from 1997 to 2004, which means that we have data for four years before
the Internet exposure, 1997-2000, and for four years after, 2001-2004. We restrict
our analysis to persons of working age (25-59 in 1997) who had positive income
over the whole period,18 and lived in the same municipality in the period 1997-
2000.19 Given that the assignment into groups with and without paper catalogues
prior to the Internet disclosure in 2001 is a key characteristic of the identication
strategy, we restrict the sample to individuals living in the 138 municipalities20 in
the treatment and control groups prior to 2001. This means that we exploit data
for approximately 370,000 individuals.
In Table 1, which shows estimates of mean values for individual-level char-
acteristics used in the regressions (Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the
municipality-level variables), the two di¤erent time periods are referred to as "be-
fore" and "after". The income concept used is "earned income", consisting of
18Persons with zero or negative income in one or more periods are excluded, which reduces
the sample by approximately 20 percent. We have established that further sample restrictions,
for example to taxpayers with more than NOK10,000 in income each year, do not inuence the
main empirical ndings.
19We do this to ensure that modes of disclosure (before 2001) are fully absorbed by the indi-
viduals.
20The identication of the municipalities in the treatment and control groups were described
in Section 3
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wage income and earnings from self-employment (and other organizational forms
which require that individuals report business income and there is no third-party
information reporting). Thus, the measure of income used does not include capital
income. However, we show results for an alternative denition of income (capital
income included) in the sensitivity tests, following the presentation of main re-
sults. Further, we categorize individuals as being business owners or wage earners.
This is done with respect to accumulated income over the whole eight-year time
period, and individuals are allocated into one of the two groups depending on
the most dominant income source: business income or wage income.21 Moreover,
Table 1 sheds light on the key identifying tool of the present paper, by showing
separate gures for people belonging to municipalities with and without distri-
bution of paper catalogues in the rst time period. The table includes gures
for a number of individual characteristics that are controlled for in the empirical
analysis: education (dummies for having education at the high school level and at
the university level, respectively), marital status, number of children, gender and
immigrant background.
We see that the average rst-period income level, both among among business
owners and wage earners, is somewhat higher in the "non-catalogue" areas. Ed-
ucation may be an explanation for that di¤erence, as we see that a higher share
of the population has a university-level education in these municipalities. But of
more interest and consistent with the main hypothesis of the paper, we observe
that the average growth in reported income among business owners in the "non-
catalogue" areas is higher than in the "catalogue" areas: 18.5 percent and 16.1
percent, respectively. This is further illustrated in Figure 1, where the average
reported income di¤erences between non-catalogue and catalogue municipalities
are shown for each year of the period 1993-2004 (thus, we have added information
for four years prior to 1997)22 for wage earners and business owners, respectively.
The vertical line marks that the change in disclosure happened between the re-
porting of incomes for 2000 and 2001, and the gure clearly depicts an abrupt
21The tax system in place in the time period under investigation here was a dual income tax,
introduced by the tax reform of 1992, and replaced by a modied version of the dual income
tax system in 2006; see, for example, Sørensen (2005) and Thoresen, Bø, Fjærli, and Halvorsen
(2012). Self-employed and owners of closely held rms report business income, and the so-called
"split model" of the Norwegian dual income tax describes how this income is divided into capital
return and a return to the labor e¤ort of the active owner. Thoresen and Alstadsæter (2010)
describe how the split model of the dual income tax motivated business owners to move to a
widely held rm organization to lower their tax burden. However, given the empirical approach of
the present paper, we do not expect such manoeuvres to a¤ect our results, as any such incentives
would be identical as between businesses located in catalogue and non-catalogue municipalities.
22Given the data restrictions (persons should be observed in all years, 1993-2004), the extra
years mean that the number of observations (each year) underlying Figure 1 is somewhat smaller
(around six percent) than in the sample used in the regressions.
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Table 1: Averages for individual characteristics, 1997-2000 (before) and 2001-2004
(after)
Business owners
Non-catalogue Catalogue
Before After Before After
Income (NOK)a 295,125 349,789 275,964 320,467
Wage income (NOK)a 38,204 40,987 31,758 38,190
Business income (NOK)a 256,920 308,802 244,207 282,277
High school education .57 .57 .61 .61
University education .14 .14 .13 .13
Married .69 .69 .69 .70
Number of children .87 .72 .87 .72
Age (rst period) 44.4 44.7
Male .76 .75
Immigrant .028 .022
Number of individuals 21,493 8,091
Wage Earners
Non-catalogue Catalogue
Before After Before After
Income (NOK)a 255,035 305,820 234,469 281,485
Wage income (NOK)a 250,501 301,524 229,128 276,843
Business income (NOK)a 4,535 4,296 5,341 4,642
High school education .51 .52 .51 .52
University education .26 .27 .24 .25
Married .64 .65 .62 .63
Number of children .89 .78 .86 .74
Age (rst period) 42.3 42.4
Male .52 .51
Immigrant .031 .022
Number of individuals 266,345 78,111
a Average exchange rate against USD, 1997-2004: 1$=7.75NOK
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Table 2: Averages for municipality-level characteristics
Non-catalogue Catalogue Others
Population (2000) 8,416 8,601 10,467
Increase in number of inhabitants, 2000-2004 168 128 260
Births per 1000 inhabitants (2001) 11.7 10.6 11.6
Share in high population density area (2001) 49.0 44.0 47.7
Unemployment rate (2000) 2.75 2.39 2.67
Increase in unemployment rate, 2000-2004 .98 .63 .98
Main economic activitya
Share in construction .26 .23 .23
Share in sheries .09 .03 .08
Share in manufacturing .55 .68 .62
Share in farming .29 .42 .27
Share in service sector .61 .52 .59
Number of municipalities 107 31 297
a Each municipality is described by either one or a combination of two main activities
change beginning in 2001, as the di¤erence between average income for business
owners moves above the similar measure for wage earners.23 Figure A2 in Appen-
dix A shows the income developments behind Figure 1, that is, the development
in reported income for wage earners and business owners in the catalogue and
non-catalogue areas, respectively. Of note (in Figure A2) is a marked reduction
in reported income for owners of businesses in 2003, which is due to a change in
the denition of business income.24 However, we have no reason to expect that
the variation in the denition of income a¤ects the measurement of income for the
two groups of business owners di¤erently.25 Also in Appendix A, Figure A3 shows
a log version of Figure 1, which depicts the same general pattern.
As the treatment is at the municipality level, possible di¤erences between
treated and non-treated municipalities are of interest. In the regressions to come,
we use xed e¤ects to control for observed or unobserved di¤erences between mu-
nicipalities. Still, if there are systematic di¤erences between the municipalities
23The time series stops in 2004 because the tax reform of 2006 (phased in during 2005) rep-
resents a break in the relevant tax institutions. Both schedules and tax bases were changed by
the reform.
24The dependency on accounting rules is a drawback of data taken from administrative regis-
ters.
25We have also estimated Equation (1) without the years 2003 and 2004. The point estimates
are similar to what we obtain when including all years in the regressions, while the standard
errors are somewhat smaller.
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Figure 1: Di¤erences in average reported income (thousand Norwegian kroner)
between residents of non-catalogue and catalogue municipalities, 1993-2004. Wage
earners and business owners.
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Based on the 350,203 individuals present in all 12 years: 322,343 wage earners,
27,860 business owners.
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that a¤ect both the treatment and the outcome variable, the identication may be
in doubt. Thus, there are reasons to explore to what extent the municipalities in
the two groups di¤er. This can be done as the individual income data are linked to
information on municipality characteristics derived from the KOSTRA database,
which is established by Statistics Norway for the comparison of municipalities. For
example, the database includes population and employment statistics for the mu-
nicipalities of Norway (Statistics Norway, 2012a; Statistics Norway, 2012b). Some
of the variables presented in Table 2 are characteristics that may be interpreted as
indicators of economic prosperity, such as population growth, birth rates, unem-
ployment and changes in local unemployment rates. We also include population
size and the share of the population living in densely populated areas. Finally,
we also include a description of the nature of the economic activity in the mu-
nicipalities in terms of an industry classication system, which was developed by
Statistics Norway in the mid-1990s (thus, some years before the data period). It
consists of 16 di¤erent categories, characterizing the main economic activities of
the municipality, such as farming, sheries, manufacturing, service sectors, etc.,
which we code as dummy variables.
Table 2 presents mean values for the municipality level information (including
the main categories from the economic classication system), given the categoriza-
tion into the non-catalogue and the catalogue groups. We also present information
from the remaining municipalities, with unknown treatment status. As with the
individual characteristics, there are di¤erences between the average measures, but
the di¤erences do not unambiguously give support to any conjectures regarding dif-
ferential economic development in the two groups. We see that population growth
and birth rates are higher on average in the non-catalogue areas, as are unemploy-
ment rates and unemployment growth. The shares of municipalities in di¤erent
main economic activities are not fundamentally di¤erent in the two groups. More-
over, the municipalities both in the treatment and control groups seem to be quite
similar to the average unclassied municipality. We will anyway use municipal-
ity xed e¤ects in the regressions; in one specication we also let income growth
depend on the industry classication.
4.2 Main results
As an introduction to identication of public disclosure through estimation of
Equation (1), Table 3 presents a simple tabular version of the results based on the
income estimates of Table 1; thus, income is measured in levels rather than logs.
The table shows that the di¤erence in growth of reported income (measured as the
di¤erence in average income growth between 1997-2000 and 2001-2004) between
business owners in non-catalogue and catalogue municipalities (as already noted)
is 2.39 percentage points. If we adjust the benchmark for di¤erences between in-
18
Table 3: Growth in average reported income, between 1997-2000 and 2001-2004.
Business owners and wage earners in non-catalogue and catalogue municipalities
Non-catalogue Catalogue Di¤erence
Income growth of business owners 18.52 16.13 2.39
Income growth of wage earners 19.91 20.05 -.14
come growth for wage earners of the two groups of municipalities (-.14), which
is the case under the specication presented in Equation (1), the e¤ect of public
disclosure is slightly larger, 2.53 percentage points. The small di¤erence in income
growth between wage earners in catalogue and non-catalogue areas, reported in
Table 3, suggests that results are less inuenced by either employing a triple dif-
ference specication (including wage earners) or a double di¤erence specication
(excluding wage earners). Correspondingly, the public disclosure e¤ect from an
estimation of a specication that focuses on e¤ects among business owners alone
(see Appendix B) is very similar to results for the triple di¤erence specication
(see below).
Next, in Table 4, we turn to ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation results
for Equation (1). Errors may be serially correlated in panel data and there may be
other sources of clustering, which means that error terms are not i.i.d. Following
recommendations by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2006),26 we use two-way clus-
tering. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and by year. Results
for three di¤erent specications are presented: regression (1) does not include any
controls for characteristics of the individuals or municipality level industry specic
growth, regression (2) accounts for individual characteristics, whereas specica-
tion (3) controls for both individual characteristics and municipality level industry
specic growth (all specications have xed municipality e¤ects).
When the distribution of paper catalogues in some municipalities prior to the
Internet exposure is used for identication, a positive e¤ect of public disclosure
clearly stands out, as signied by the parameter estimates of 5. The estimate
for specication (3) (controlling for both individual characteristics and industry
specic growth) suggests that on average approximately 3.1 percent of the growth
in the reported income among business owners in the non-catalogue areas can
be attributed to the substantially increased Internet exposure a¤ecting incomes
for 2001 and after. The standard error is 0.66, a highly signicant result (p-
value below 0.01 percent). In terms of the average income measures of Table 1,
this means that without public disclosure, the average reported income among
business owners after 2001 would have been less than NOK340,000, instead of
approximately NOK350,000. Note, though, that Figure 1 may suggest that the
26See also Bertrand, Duo and Mullainathan (2004) and Donald and Lang (2007).
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e¤ect may be fading by the end of the period under investigation (in 2004).
This baseline result is largely invariant with respect to the extent to which
other observable characteristics are controlled for. Correspondingly, the regres-
sion results are close to the results of Table 3 (the table version shows results for
di¤erences in percentage points and does not apply the log transformation). We
interpret this as corroborative evidence for exploiting a group assignment proce-
dure that is minimally subject to omitted variables bias. In Table B1 in Appendix
B we show estimation results for the public disclosure e¤ect given a more restricted
sample, consisting of business owners only.
To illustrate the economic inuence of this e¤ect, we have carried out some
simplied calculations. As already noted, an income growth of 3.1 percent cor-
responds to an income increase of approximately NOK10,000. When multiplying
this gure by the average number self-employed in 2001-2004, and using the av-
erage tax rate for the group (0.27), we calculate that the e¤ect of Internet public
disclosure on revenue nationwide would be approximately NOK0.5 billion. For
2001 this corresponds to approximately 0.2 percent of the total tax revenue from
the individual income tax. If the level of underreporting among business owners
in Norway is similar to what recent studies have found in the neighboring coun-
tries (see Engström and Holmlund (2009), Kleven et al. (2011) and Johansson
(2005), for estimates Sweden, Denmark and Finland, respectively), there is still
(after Internet public disclosure) substantial tax evasion among business owners.
If we use the estimate of Kleven et al. (2011) for Denmark as an indicator of the
magnitude, suggesting that 15 percent of self-employment income is evaded,27 it
follows that the estimated e¤ect of Internet public disclosure of 3.1 percent has
cut tax evasion in this group by approximately one-fth. In the appraisal of this
back-of-the-envelope estimate, one should remember that there was a system for
public disclosure before the Internet exposure, which most likely moderates the
e¤ect, and that there is no public disclosure e¤ect in the estimate for Denmark.
Our identication of the impact of public disclosure rests upon several assump-
tions, some of which will be addressed in the next subsection. The key assumption
that business owners in the catalogue area are not inuenced by the Internet expo-
sure - the common trend assumption - is not testable. However, Figure 1 does not
provide any strong indication of the control group also changing behavior. More-
over, it is important to note that the implication of public disclosure also a¤ecting
members of the control groups is that the estimates of Table 4 are downward
biased.
27Johansson (2005) estimates that self-employment income is underreported by 1640 percent
in Finland, whereas Engström and Holmlund (2009) nd, using Swedish data, that households
with at least one self-employed member underreport their total incomes by around 30 percent.
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Table 4: E¤ect of public disclosure on income reporting. Estimation results for
regressions based on pre-2001 catalogue group assignment
(1) (2) (3)
Explanatory var. Coe¤. Est. S.E. Est. S.E. Est. S.E.
Business owner 1 .0128*** (.020) .028 (.018) .027 (.018)
Business owner/
post-2001 2 -.068* (.037) -.041 (.037) -.038 (.035)
Business owner/
non-catalogue 3 -.021 (.024) -.006 (.020) -.006 (.020)
Post-2001/
non-catalogue 4 -.002 (.003) -.002 (.003) -.004 (.003)
Public disclosurea 5 .034*** (.008) .032*** (.008) .031*** (.007)
Indiv. control var.b No Yes Yes
Industry spec. gr.c No No Yes
Observations 2,992,320 2,992,320 2,992,320
R-squared .035 .206 .207
*** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
Standard errors clustered at municipality level, and by year.
a Business owners in the non-catalogue area after Internet exposure, wage earners incl.
b Age, age squared, education at high school or university level, marital status, number
of children, gender and immigrant background.
c Flexible trend in industry specic growth; year interacted with municipality industry
classication.
All specications with xed e¤ects for years and municipalities.
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4.3 Robustness checks and heterogeneous responses
In this section we assess the robustness of the main results with respect to some
alternative methodological choices. We will address the denition of income, in-
ference and functional form dependence. We also do robustness checks in the form
of placebo tests, municipality matching, and panel data estimation. In order to
explore which groups of business owners who have responded, we also look at
response heterogeneity. For the purpose of comparison we use the public disclo-
sure estimate from Table 4, column (3) (based on Equation (1), with controls for
individual characteristics and municipality level industry specic growth) as the
benchmark.
Denition of income So far we have used gross "earned income" as the
income variable. In Table 5 we show results for an alternative income concept:
"ordinary income" under the dual income tax system of Norway, which is the in-
come concept actually reported by the tax authorities in the public disclosure.
This measure of income takes taxable transfers, capital income and some income
deductions into account in addition to wage and business income. We see a clearly
signicant response estimate when using this alternative income concept, too; in-
terestingly, the measured response is higher than the main estimate (referred to
as the "Base specication" in Table 5). One possible explanation for the higher
estimate may be that business owners to a larger extent can use self-reported de-
ductions to adjust their incomes and tax burdens (in contrast to wage earners,
whose deductions are primarily third-party-reported). Then the higher estimate
reects both a higher reported income and a reduction in unwarranted deductions.
Inference As already discussed, an important challenge of the empirical de-
sign is the possibility of correlations over time and between individuals of the same
group, which may result in clustered or non-independent errors.28 Ignoring such
e¤ects increases the probability of false rejections of the null hypothesis. Conse-
quently, above we reported results for a procedure suggested by Cameron, Gelbach
and Miller (2006), which adjusts measures of variance for two-way clustering, both
municipality and year clustering.
In Table 5 we show results for three alternative methods to derive standard
errors, to show that the signicance of our main estimate for the e¤ect of public
disclosure is not dependent on the precise method of statistical inference. To facil-
itate comparison, in Table 5 we report estimates in terms of percentage changes.
The robust variance refers to the standard "sandwich" (or Eicker-Huber-White)
28Recall that no specic measures have been taken to utilize the person-level panel structure
of the data. We discuss results of panel data estimation below.
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estimate of variance, which accounts for heteroskedastic disturbances by using the
empirical variance-covariance matrix; see Froot (1989) and Rogers (1993). Fol-
lowing recommendations by Bertrand, Duo and Mullainathan (2004) to calculate
consistent standard errors, we also show results for two methods to account for
serially correlated errors: one-way clustering at the municipality level and a speci-
cation that diminishes the e¤ect of the panel dimension of the data by aggregating
into two periods only, before and after the Internet exposure. Even though some
variation in estimates and standard errors across techniques are observed, all mea-
sures give support to public disclosure having a statistically signicant e¤ect on
the reported income of businesses.
Functional form dependence Several authors have noted that the stan-
dard di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator involves scale-dependent identifying as-
sumptions; see Meyer, Viscusi and Durbin (1995), Heckman (1996) and Athey
and Imbens (2006). In other words, the results of the analysis may be dependent
on the functional form. For example, in our analysis we have employed a log trans-
formation of the dependent variable, which puts a restriction on the common trend
assumption that is di¤erent from what would be the case if we use non-transformed
income as the dependent variable; for instance, Meyer et al. (1995) found results
that were sensitive to this choice. Similarly, Table 5 shows that results are altered
by using a non-transformed dependent variable. When recalculating the estimate
of a regression with a non-transformed variable to make it comparable to the
base specication, the estimate is now 1.79, and it is only statistically signicant
di¤erent from zero at the 10% level.
Further, we have investigated results for an alternative specication to ex-
plore whether the public disclosure e¤ect di¤ers over the distribution of income.
The usual method is quantile regression, where the conditional median, or an-
other quantile of the distribution, of the dependent variable is a linear function of
the regressors, as in Koenker and Hallock (2001). In addition to being based on
an alternative econometric specication (for example, in a median regression the
coe¢ cients will be estimated by minimizing the absolute deviations from the me-
dian),29 this method very straighforwardly provides information about how slope
coe¢ cients vary over the income distribution.30 To get estimates of the uncondi-
tional quantile e¤ect, we use the unconditional quantile regression method advised
by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009). Thus, the unconditional quantile regressions
provide predictions for the median or another point of the income distribution with
29There may also be other arguments for applying a quantile formulation, such as providing a
more e¢ cient estimator than OLS when the error term is non-normal.
30Of course, possible non-linear relationships can be investigated under OLS too. However,
quantile regression is a method where the distributional aspect is innate. See also Athey and
Imbens (2006), who propose a nonlinear di¤erence-in-di¤erences method.
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Figure 2: E¤ect of public disclosure on income reporting across percentiles. Quan-
tile regressions for specication based on pre-2001 catalogue group assignment
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respect to public disclosure.
Figure 2 presents results of a number of quantile regressions (one for each
percentile). For the median, we nd an estimate of 2.2 percent, which is somewhat
lower than the 3.1 percent change according to OLS. We note that point estimates
are mostly above the horizontal (i.e., zero e¤ect) line, but see that for income
levels above the 70th percentile point estimates are primarily negative, though not
signicant (according to the 95 percent condence interval). People who already
report high income may be less exposed to the shaming e¤ect, but note also that
local newspapers reported the income and tax information of inhabitants with very
high income (such as the top 50-100 of the local area) even before 2001. Higher-
income taxpayers may have behaved as if there was e¤ective public disclosure of
their tax information even before it was available on the Internet. The lower
estimates at higher percentiles may also explain why the level specication (not
log income), which implies that more weight is given to the top incomes, produces
a smaller response estimate (compared to the base specication).
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Table 5: E¤ect of public disclosure on reported incomes for alternative method-
ological approaches
Estimate Standard errora
Base specicationb 3.11*** 0.68
Other denition of income
All taxable income minus deductions 4.73*** 1.12
Alternative variance estimators
Robust variance 3.11*** 0.71
Clustering at the municipality level 3.11*** 1.10
Collapsed income for two periods 3.11*** 0.68
Alternative functional forms
No log-transformation of dependent variable 1.79* 0.93
Median regression 2.17*** 0.44
Placebo tests
Internet exposure introduced in 1999 -0.12 0.91
Prop. score alloc. of control group municip. -0.07 1.05
Matching
Propensity score 3.09*** 0.87
Panel data method
Fixed e¤ectc 3.11*** 1.13
Specic groups
Doctors, lawyers, engineers, etc. 4.24*** 1.53
Taxi drivers, restaurant owners, etc. -0.51 0.80
Above median municip. population density 2.72*** 0.74
Above median municip. population 2.84*** 0.67
*** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
a Standard errors clustered at municipality level, and by year, unless otherwise stated.
b Column (3) in table 5, specication with individual controls and industry specic growth.
c Standard errors clustered at the municipality level.
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Placebo tests In order to assess to what extent the method is sensitive to
picking up e¤ects that are unrelated to the phenomenon in question, we have
carried out two di¤erent placebo tests. In the rst test we proceed as if the
intervention happened in 1999 instead of 2001, and measure incomes in the years
before and after, 1997-1998 and 1999-2000.31
The second placebo test uses results of propensity score estimation (Rosen-
baum and Rubin, 1983) to generate a placebo reform for half of the control group
municipalities. If it is possible to obtain signicant results based on observable
characteristics of the municipalities, it would indicate that there are observable
characteristics correlated with the treatment and contributing to the signicant
e¤ect of the main estimate. To test whether this is the case, we estimate the
propensity of treatment (i.e. sales of tax lists) based on municipality charac-
teristics and municipality level mean values of individual characteristics.32 The
municipalities in the control group are then allocated to (placebo) treatment and
control groups, depending on their propensity score. The 15 municipalities with
the highest propensity are allocated to the treatment group, and the 15 municipal-
ities with the lowest propensity score are allocated to the control group. Equation
(1) is then estimated with the new data set.
As shown in Table 5, the two placebo tests reveal no signs of an e¤ect of public
disclosure on reported income. This is consistent with our belief that the assign-
ment mechanism based on paper catalogues represents a convincing assignment
procedure for maintaining a common trend assumption.
Matching Propensity score matching is usually used to enhance compara-
bility between groups. Table 2 reveals some di¤erences between the municipalities
in our control and treatment group. One might worry that, even though we use
controls for municipality characteristics, these di¤erences may bias the results. In
contrast to one of the sensitivity tests above, where we exploited propensity score
matching to design a placebo reform, we now use matching to make the control
and treatment group more similar.33 The average propensity scores34 of the control
and treatment group in our sample are, respectively, .65 and .81 before matching.
31The years after 2000 are excluded, as they have been a¤ected by the real reform.
32The propensity score estimation is a probit estimation of the probability of treatment for a
municipality, based on municipality characteristics and mean values of individual characteristics.
The municipality characteristics used are population, births per 1000 inhabitants, the share of
residents in high population density area, rate of unemployment and industry classication; all
measured in the year 2000. We also use the following variables, for each municipality averaged
in the years 1997-2000 over the individuals in our sample: wage, age, sex, education and share
of business owners.
33See also Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997) and Abadie (2005) for approaches to matching.
34This is estimated as described in the last subsection.
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Municipalities are matched by pairwise (or nearest neighbor) matching.35 We then
have a data set consisting of 29 matched municipality pairs, which are as similar as
possible based on observable characteristics.36 The individuals in these two groups
are then used as a new sample, on which we estimate equation (1). Given the close
correspondence between matching techniques and regressions (they are both con-
trol strategies) and the small e¤ects of accounting for other explanatory variables
on the estimate of the public disclosure e¤ect, we do not expect the results to be
sensitive to the use of a propensity score technique. Accordingly, we nd that the
estimate of the public disclosure e¤ect is very similar to the estimate of the base
specication.
Panel data estimation So far, the panel dimension of the data has not
been utilized in the identication of e¤ects, and we might as well have used data
from repeated cross-sections. In order to take advantage of the panel dimension
of the data and ascertain to what extent results are inuenced by controlling for
individual heterogeneity, we have estimated an individual xed e¤ects version of
Equation (1). This allows us to control for possible unobserved, time-constant
characteristics of individuals that are correlated with the independent variables.
As expected, given the close correspondence between di¤erence-in-di¤erence esti-
mation and xed e¤ects estimation, this specication also gives a clearly signicant
e¤ect of public disclosure: the point estimate is 3.11, exactly similar to the estimate
of the base specication, though the standard error is somewhat larger.
Response heterogeneity There are reasons to expect that there are dif-
ferences across industries with respect to underreporting. Given that we have
added to the dataset detailed information about which industry the business own-
ers belong to (Statistics Norway, 2005),37 there is scope for further examination
of di¤erences across di¤erent sectors. In Table 5 we report the result of an esti-
mation that have been carried out when limiting the group of business owners to
taxi drivers and owners of bars, restaurants and other catering businesses. These
groups of businesses have been subject to news reports of tax evasion, and have
also received particular attention from Norwegian tax authorities; for example, in
the budget proposal for 2013 (Ministry of Finance, 2012), new regulations have
been proposed to reduce tax evasion among taxi drivers. Without any further
priors, we refer to empirical investigations by Erard and Ho (2003) and Artavanis,
35We use a caliper, i.e. the largest allowed di¤erence of propensity score between matches, of
.025. Two treated municipalities does not have any matches within the .025 caliper, and are thus
dropped.
36The propensity score is now respectively .66 and .65 for the control and treatment group.
37The industry classication follows the structure of the NACE code used by the European
Union. Where the code di¤ers between years for an individual, the modal code is used.
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Morse and Tsoutsoura (2012). The latter study shows empirical evidence of more
tax evasion among doctors, engineers, private tutors, nancial services agents, ac-
countants, and lawyers.38 Thus, we estimate our base specication on business
owners only from these groups.39
Table 5 shows a stronger e¤ect than average for a group that includes doctors,
lawyers, engineers, and other professions. For taxi drivers and restaurant own-
ers, however, the non-signicant estimate for the public disclosure e¤ect suggests
that Internet exposure has no inuence (on average) on the income reporting of
individuals belonging to these types of businesses. We take this as corroborative
evidence of the deterrence e¤ect of public disclosure working through a shaming
e¤ect. Whereas the e¤ect of public disclosure is large for businesses where reputa-
tion is important, as for instance for lawyers, there is no e¤ect in businesses where
tax evasion is believed to be more common.
We may also explore if there are any other individual or municipality charac-
teristics that mediate the magnitude of the public disclosure e¤ect. For instance,
it may be argued that the population density inuences public disclosure, i.e.
the shaming e¤ect is more relevant in small, transparent communities. When re-
stricting the data set to individuals belonging to municipalities with above median
population density, we see that the point estimate is somewhat lower than the base
specication estimate. Thus, this result suggests that the public disclosure e¤ect
is somewhat larger in less densely populated, presumably rural, municipalities,
although the di¤erence is not large. Similarly, in municipalities with population
above the median, the public disclosure e¤ect is somewhat smaller.
5 Conclusion
As of 2001 any Norwegian taxpayer with access to the Internet could nd individual
information on income, wealth, and income and wealth taxes paid. Prior to 2001,
in some local areas access to this information was widespread. We have used this
fundamental change in access to disclosure to identify income reporting e¤ects of
public disclosure. We attribute an approximately 3 percent increase in reported
38Artavanis et al. use the larger loans given to self-employed, compared to wage earners with
similar incomes, as indication of tax evasion. Their explanation for the di¤erence in tax evasion
between business categories is a di¤erence in paper trail. Erard and Ho (2004) also nd more
tax evasion among lawyers and doctors.
39The categories included are: building of complete constructions or parts thereof; civil en-
gineering; nancial intermediation and activities auxiliary to nancial intermediation; legal, ac-
counting, book-keeping and auditing activities; tax consultancy; market research and public
opinion polling; business and management consultancy; holding; adult and other education;
medical practice activities; activities of religious, political and other membership organisations.
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income to Internet public disclosure. The main hypothesis of a shaming e¤ect
from public disclosure on tax evasion is also supported by nding somewhat larger
e¤ects in smaller, less densely populated areas, and for business categories which
are believed to be "reputation sensitive".
To our knowledge this is the rst empirical estimate of the e¤ect of public
disclosure on overall individual tax compliance. As there was public disclosure of
tax and income information before the change to the Internet exposure in Norway,
the measured 3 percent e¤ect is most likely limited by this, which means that larger
e¤ects of Internet public disclosure may be expected under other institutional
conditions. We note, though, that the Norwegian version of public disclosure
discussed in this paper is a rather specic and extreme type of disclosure that is
arguably infeasible in many countries.
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6 Appendix
A Figure appendix
Figure A.1: Spatial location of catalogue and non-catalogue municipalities
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Figure A.2: Average reported income 1993-2004, wage earners and business own-
ers. Thousand Norwegian kroner.
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Based on the 350,203 individuals present in all 12 years: 322,343 wage earners,
27,860 business owners.
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Figure A.3: Di¤erences in log of average reported income between non-catalogue
and catalogue municipalities,1993-2004. Wage earners and business owners.
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Based on the 350,203 individuals present in all 12 years: 322,343 wage earners,
27,860 business owners.
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B Estimation results for other specications
As discussed in the main body of the text, alternative specications to Equation (1)
have also been estimated. Here we refer to estimation results for two specations
which each removes one dimension from Equation (1), the distinction between
catalogue and non-catalogue areas and the occupational group dimension (restrict
to business owners only), respectively. Thus, we present estimation results for
log yijt = 0 + t +X
0
it + 1busj + 2 (busj  intt) +Z 0k + "ijt, and for log yijt =
0 + t +X
0
it + 1 (nocatk  intt) +Z 0k + "ikt, respectively, where 0, t, 1, 2,
and  are parameters. Variable explanations can be found in Section 3.
Table B1: E¤ect of public disclosure on income reporting. OLS estimation
results for specication based on wage earner/business owner group assignment
(1) (2) (3)
Explanatory var. Coe¤. Est. S.E. Est. S.E. Est. S.E.
Business owner 1 .113*** (.015) .024 (.015) .022 (.015)
Business owner/
post-2001 2 -.043 (.034) -.018 (.034) -.015 (.032)
Indiv. control var.a No Yes Yes
Industry spec. gr.b No No Yes
Observations 2,992,320 2,992,320 2,992,320
R-squared .035 .206 .207
*** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
Standard errors clustered at municipality level, and by year.
a Age, age squared, education at high school or university level, marital status, number
of children, gender and immigrant background.
b Flexible trend in industry specic growth; year interacted with municipality industry
classication.
All specications with xed e¤ects for years and municipalities.
The parameter estimate for b2 in Table B1 shows that the identication of
public disclosure in Equation (1) rests on the information on catalogue and non-
catalogue areas, and is not captured by a simple double di¤erence estimation
strategy based on di¤erences between business owners and wage earners before
and after 2001. As signied by negative and insignicant parameter estimates,
there are no signs of business owners as a group increasing their reported income
after 2001, in comparison with wage earners. Such an empirical strategy is subject
to several confounding factors. For instance may time-dependent unobservables,
as the business cycle, blur the identication of responses among business owners
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as a group. Moreover, the change in the measurement of business income in 2003,
as seen in Figure A.2, inuences the results.
Next, the inclusion of wage earners to depict the trend in incomes without
the e¤ect of Internet exposure, as in Equation (1), may be questioned. There
may, for instance, be confounding factors that generate di¤erential wage growth
among business owners and not among wage earners. One cannot rule out that
public disclosure may have a¤ected wage earners too, and in that case the e¤ect is
most likely stronger for the wage earners of the non-catalogue area. Therefore we
also derive estimates for an empirical specication restricted to business owners
alone. Table B2 reveals, as expected given the very small di¤erence in growth
rates presented in Table 3, that the public disclosure e¤ect in this more restricted
sample is close to (and a little smaller) than the estimate seen in Table 4.
Table B2: E¤ect of public disclosure on income reporting. OLS estimation
results specication based on 2001 pre-catalogue assignment,
business owners only
(1) (2) (3)
Explanatory var. Coe¤. Est. S.E. Est. S.E. Est. S.E.
Public disclosurea  .032*** (.013) .030** (.013) .025** (.010)
Indiv. control var.b No Yes Yes
Industry spec. gr.c No No Yes
Observations 236,672 236,672 236,672
R-squared .051 .159 .160
*** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
Standard errors clustered at municipality level, and by year.
a Business owners in the non-catalogue area after Internet exposure
b Age, age squared, education at high school or university level, marital status, number
of children, gender and immigrant background.
c Flexible trend in industry specic growth; year interacted with municipality industry
classication.
All specications with xed e¤ects for years and municipalities.
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